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QUO VADIS: THE CONTINUING
METAMORPHOSIS OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
CLAUSE TOWARD REALISTIC SUBSTANTIVE
NEUTRALITY
Paul E. Salamanca*
For years, the rhetoric of substantive neutrality has dominated interpretation
of the Establishment Clause. Under this approach, courts and commentators
purport to ask whether a public policy under scrutiny is likely to affect religious
choices in an unacceptable way.' In fact, so broadly has this approach been
taken that both separationists and accommodationists resort to it freely,
although with radically differing perceptions as to when policy becomes
unacceptable. Arguably, however, adherents to this approach have paid
insufficient attention to religious behavior per se. Had they paid sufficient
attention to this phenomenon, they would have been forced to acknowledge that
little of what government does actually affects people's religious beliefs.
Moreover, they would have been forced to recognize that vindication of basic
human rights will operate as a bar to religious persecution long before such
persecution is likely to affect religious choices. In fact, I would argue that a
desire to vindicate such rights far more fully accounts for the United States
Supreme Court's approach to the Establishment Clause in the mid-twentieth
century than any real concern for substantive neutrality.
In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,2 the Supreme Court took a big step toward
establishing formal neutrality as the preferred means of interpreting the
Establishment Clause.3 Under the plan at issue in the case, qualifying children
Associate Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law.
See generally Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001-02 (1990):
My basic formulation of substantive neutrality is this: the religion clauses require
government to minimize the extent to which it either encourages or discourages
religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, observance or nonobservance.
[In other words,] religion is to be left as wholly to private choice as anything can be.
2 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
3 For purposes of this paper, I am defining "formally neutral" interpretation of the
Establishment Clause as use of the clause exclusively to prohibit acts by the government
designed to promote or inhibit religion as such. See generally Laycock, supra note 1, at 999-
BRANDEIS LAW JOURNAL
in Cleveland could take public money in the form of a voucher and spend it at• • 4
any of a number of schools, public and private - even sectarian. In fact, most
of the participating private schools had religious affiliations, and most students
used their vouchers at such schools. 5 The majority upheld the plan, refusing to
allow actual experience to resolve the case. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court emphasized parents' role in the plan, noting that the decision where to
apply a voucher lay with them, not with the government.7 The following
essentially formalist rule guided the Court's decision:
[W]here a government aid program is neutral with respect to religion, and
provides assistance directly to a broad class of citizens who, in turn, direct
government aid to religious schools wholly as a result of their own genuine
and independent private choice, the program is not readily subject to
challenge under the Establishment Clause.
In upholding Cleveland's plan on these grounds, the Court took a large step
away from ostensible substantive neutrality and toward formal neutrality as the
touchstone for non-establishment. Although the Court included some
constraints in its rule - the assistance must go "directly" to a "broad class of
citizens," who then redirect aid to religious entities - this rule nevertheless
portends a significant shift in the jurisprudence of the Establishment Clause.
Elementary and secondary education lie at the center of American cultural and
political strife, and finance is and always has been a fundamental aspect of
educational policy. Although the Court had previously decided cases involving
1001. For obvious reasons, a formally neutral approach toward free exercise is also
conceivable. See Philip Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1, 96 (1961) (arguing that the Religion Clauses, "read together as they should be, prohibit
classification in terms of religion either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden"). In fact, the
Supreme Court essentially adopted such an approach in Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.
872 (1990).
4 See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2463 ("Any private school, whether religious or nonreligious,
may participate in the program and accept program students so long as the school is located
within the boundaries of a covered school district and meets statewide educational standards.").
5 See id. at 2464 ("In the 1999-2000 school year, 56 private schools participated in the
program, 46 (or 82%) of which had a religious affiliation."); id. ("More than 3,700 students
participated in the ... program, most of whom (96%) enrolled in religiously affiliated
schools.").
6 See id. at 2470 ("The constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does
not turn on whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are
run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use the aid at a religious school.").
7 See, e.g., id. at 2464 ("Where tuition aid is spent depends solely upon where parents who
receive tuition aid choose to enroll their child.").
' Id. at 2467.
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educational finance on formally neutral terms, the activities at issue in these
earlier cases had never provided more than marginal or idiosyncratic benefits to
religiously based education - marginal in the sense of not going to central,
unavoidable expenses, such as teachers' salaries or brick-and-mortar needs,9
and idiosyncratic in the sense of affecting only small, inherently circumscribed
categories of students.'°
I support the decision in Zelman, for reasons I explain more fully
elsewhere," but which I will describe quickly here. Education is a complex
social activity that facilitates and organizes the transfer of vast amounts of
cultural and technical information. It is also an inherently normative process,
where it is difficult to separate the secular from the theological. On the other
hand, the promotion of diverse opinion and philosophy is an affirmative value
that underlies the First Amendment. Thus, a financial plan that facilitates
myriad approaches to learning, including approaches that ground themselves in
theology, both avoids problems arising from monolithic approaches to
education and promotes values associated with the First Amendment. This
reasoning, I have argued, can also support so-called "charitable choice" plans.
Nevertheless, there is cause for concern regarding a completely formal
approach to the Establishment Clause. These concerns are not troublesome
enough to change my mind on the subject, but they are certainly worth pointing
out and addressing. Ultimately, I believe the courts can develop rules to
9 See Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (plurality) (government may lend educational
equipment to private, sectarian schools as part of a formally neutral program); Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (government may provide remedial educational services to students
at private, sectarian schools as part of a formally neutral program). Arguably, the law at issue in
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983), which permitted parents to deduct part of the tuition they
paid to private, sectarian schools from their gross income for purposes of taxation, went to
central, unavoidable educational expenses, but it was not an outright grant, and was therefore
considerably more complicated to obtain than such a grant. See also Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2497
(Souter, J., dissenting) ("The scale of the aid to religious schools approved today is
unprecedented, both in the number of dollars and in the proportion of systematic school
expenditure supported.").
10 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (government may
provide a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student at a religious school as part of a formally
neutral program); Witters v. Washington Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986)
(government may pay the tuition of a blind student at a seminary as part of a formally neutral
program). See also Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2490 (Souter, J., dissenting) (describing Zobrest,
Witters, and one other case as arising "in circumstances where any aid to religion was isolated
and insubstantial").
11 See Paul E. Salamanca, Choice Programs and Market-Based Separationism, 30 BUFF. L.
REV. 931 (2002).
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alleviate these concerns. In fact, I think the deviations from formal neutrality of
which the Supreme Court has already spoken approvingly justify such
confidence.
One problem with formal neutrality, other than the difficulty of defining the
term,12 is that it permits quite a bit. Assume, for example, that "peace on earth"
is a legitimate secular value. It would be hard to say that it is not. Or, assume
that "freedom from addiction" or "greater self-awareness" are legitimate secular
values. Again, it would be hard to deny these assumptions. Formal neutrality
would permit the government to sponsor activities that foster these secular
values, provided the government did not limit its sponsorship to any category of
activities that could be described as religious. Thus, formal neutrality, taken to
a plausible, logical extent, would permit the government to sponsor religious
meetings, including rituals, provided it agreed to sponsor conceptually similar
non-religious meetings (reading groups that specialize in Nietzsche, perhaps).
Similarly, formal neutrality would permit the government to sponsor meetings
of Alcoholics Anonymous and similarly religiously inspired organizations
(provided A.A. would take the money, which at present it would not do13) in
order to facilitate escape from addiction, so long as it agreed to sponsor similar
non-religious organizations, such as Rational Recovery. And the list would go
on.
This would not end the debate, of course. At most, it would simply begin
it. For example, one could respond to the preceding quasi-reductio ad
absurdum by "buying the reductio," in the reputed words of Professor Larry
Alexander. In other words, one could accept the logic of the foregoing
argument and welcome the possibility of public funding of overtly religious and
even ritualistic practices as part of a formally neutral plan. After all, such a
12 Definitional problems are minimized, and perhaps eliminated, if courts limit their focus to
the text of the law at issue. A law that, as a matter of text, neither excludes nor includes
individuals or entities because of their religious character would qualify as formally neutral
under this approach. By modest expansion of focus, courts could also inquire whether the
subject matter of a textually neutral law is so inherently religious as to support the inference that
the government intends to promote religion. Similarly, courts could take into account other
circumstantial evidence, beyond the subject matter of the law, in determining whether the
government actually adopted it with an intention to promote religion.
13 See ALCOHOLIC ANONYMOUS WORLD SERVS., INC., TWELVE STEPS AND TWELVE
TRADITIONS 160 (1952) (Seventh Tradition) ("Every A.A. group ought to be fully self-
supporting, declining outside contributions."). I have argued elsewhere that A.A. is sufficiently
religious to implicate the Establishment Clause. See Paul E. Salamanca, The Role of Religion in
Public Life and Official Pressure to Participate in Alcoholics Anonymous, 65 U. CIN. L. REV.
1093, 1159-61 (1997).
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plan would be even more liberally conceived (in the classic sense of the word)
than the so-called "non-preferentialist" interpretation of the Establishment
Clause espoused by at least one Justice. 14 On this view, it can hardly be argued
that the government "establishes" religion by the simple act of making public
funding available on a formally neutral basis to all organizations, religious and
non-religious, willing to provide an identifiably secular service.
Moreover, as regards pure policy, there are good reasons to support a non-
preferentialist plan that goes beyond religious organizations as such. We have
plausibly assumed that the plans at issue serve legitimate secular interests, and
peace on earth, freedom from addiction, and greater self-awareness are laudable
goals - compelling, even. Any plan that pursued these goals could therefore be
justified, absent undesirable side effects and undesirable motivations.
Moreover, a formally neutral plan would have the added advantage of not
excluding religious approaches to social problems. 5 As a matter of equal
treatment, this is appealing. 16
The idea of bringing religiously based organizations on board as part of a
formally neutral program is also appealing in a purely instrumental sense.
Given the intractability of many of the problems noted earlier, we would be
well-advised to ascertain whether unconventional or overlooked solutions,
including solutions that draw from religious traditions, may help us solve
14 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 99 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Establishment Clause "was definitely not concerned about whether the Government might
aid all religions evenhandedly"). But see Douglas Laycock, Nonpreferential Aid to Religion: A
False Claim About Original intent, 27 WM. & MARY. L. REV. 875 (1986); LEONARD W. LEVY,
THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT xvii (2d ed. 1994)
("[Nionpreferentialists are wrong about the framers' intentions, not just because the framers had
no position on schools, parochial or public, but because the narrow view [nonpreferentialism] is
based on a misunderstanding of what they meant.").
15 Cf Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995)
(requiring a public university to pay certain expenses of an explicitly Christian evangelical
newspaper as part of a general program supporting publications by students) ("It is, in a sense,
something of an understatement to speak of religious thought and discussion as just a viewpoint,
as distinct from a comprehensive body of thought.").
16 See Eugene Volokh, Equal Treatment Is Not Establishment, 13 NOTREDAMEJ.L. ETHics
& PUB. POL' Y 341, 345 (1999) ("Equality rings truer to our notions of the government's proper
role with regard to religion than does discrimination."). See generally Herbert Wechsler,
Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 19 (1959) ("A
principled decision.., is one that rests on reasons with respect to all the issues in the case,
reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any immediate result that is
involved.").
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them. 17 This view contrasts somewhat with the so-called "civic republican"
model from the founding era.' 8 Whereas civic republican thinkers from the
founding era were convinced that a religious establishment is indispensable to
public morality, this view more modestly claims that religious organizations
might contribute positively to a particular secular project, and should therefore
be allowed to participate with the benefit of public funding.
But separationists at least would refuse to buy the reductio of permitting
public funding of overtly religious, even ritualistic, practices pursuant to
formally neutral plans. They would rest their refusal largely on the ground that
the Establishment Clause requires more than formal neutrality in official
treatment of religion. Instead, they would argue that the clause requires the
government to avoid taking actions that materially affect people's religious
choices, even if those actions are an unintended byproduct of formally neutral
policy.' 9 In other words, they would advocate substantive rather than formal
neutrality as the proper approach to non-establishment.
In theory, substantive neutrality has much to recommend it as an approach
to the Establishment Clause. From a classically liberal perspective, we want
people to choose their religion freely, and, from a theological perspective, we
want people to be absolutely free to follow whatever divine call they hear.2° In
17 There is at least some empirical basis for concluding the religious approaches to social
problems may prove effective. See RODNEY STARK & ROGER FINKE, ACTS OF FAITH: EXPLAINING
THE HUMAN SIDE OF RELIGION 18 (2000) (noting "the immense pile of studies that have explored
the link between religiousness and psychopathology, and their consistent finding that religious
people enjoy better mental (and physical) health"); id. at 31-32; id. at 33 ("[A] huge empirical
literature finds that religious people are more likely to observe laws and norms, and that cities
with higher rates of religious participation consequently have lower rates of deviant and criminal
behavior.").
18 See generally John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the
American Constitutional Experiment, 71 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 371, 385-88 (1996). Edmund
Burke shared this view:
Every sort of moral, every sort of civil, every sort of politic institution, aiding the
rational and natural ties that connect the human understanding and affections to the
divine, are not more than necessary, in order to build up that wonderful structure,
Man; whose prerogative it is, to be in a great degree a creature of his own making.
REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 189 (Conor Cruise O'Brien, ed. 1968).
19 See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 122 S. Ct. 2460,2486 (2002) (Souter, J.,
dissenting) ("It is... only by ignoring the meaning of neutrality and private choice themselves
that the majority can even pretend to rest today's decision on those criteria.").
20 JOHN H. GARVEY, WHAT ARE FREEDOMS FOR? 50-52 (1996) (discussing the importance of
"voluntarism" in several religious traditions).
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addition, we do not want the vitality and initiative of religious traditions to be
sapped by excessive involvement with the state.
But substantive neutrality is by no means a perfect solution to the problem
of non-establishment. As a practical matter, it is difficult to gauge. Because it
requires a realistic assessment of how a particular policy is likely to affect
religious choices, it provides relatively little ex ante guidance to politicians and
bureaucrats, and it leaves judges with similarly challenging decisions to make.
2'
More fundamentally, substantive neutrality has typically rested upon unfounded
or inadequately defended premises and assumptions about the relationship
between official policy and religious choices.
For one thing, it is not altogether clear that every form of governmental
skewing of religious choices is objectionable. Certainly some are, but perhaps
not all. In addition, it is relatively easy to assume that certain official practices
will skew the religious marketplace without an empirical basis, when the real
basis for condemning the practice lies in judicial revulsion at the practice in
question. Because religious behavior is remarkably complex, 22 concerns about
the effects of official policy can often be misplaced.
The idea that some forms of official skewing may be more objectionable
than others may sound appalling, but I submit that it will not appear so after full
consideration of the point. If the government builds a highway that enables
people to drive to one church instead of another, or to drive to church at all, it
probably affects the mix of religious choices in a tiny way, but not in a way that
most people would find objectionable. At bottom, our refusal to object to such
impact is grounded in our perception that roads are neutral, that we do not build
them to encourage religious behavior, and that they typically provide benefits to
a variety of recipients. But a social scientist would not distinguish public acts
21 See Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2470 (citation omitted) (responding to the objection that eighty-
two percent of the private schools participating in Cleveland's program had religious
affiliations):
To attribute constitutional significance to this figure ... would lead to the absurd
result that a neutral school-choice program might be permissible in some parts of
Ohio, such as Columbus, where a lower percentage of private schools are religious
schools, but not in inner-city Cleveland, where Ohio has deemed such programs most
sorely needed, but where the preponderance of religious schools happens to be
greater.
22 See STARK & FINKE, supra note 17, at 113 ("[P]eople go about being religious in much
the same way that they go about everything else .... [I]n their dealings with the gods, people
bargain, shop around, procrastinate, weigh costs and benefits, skip installment payments, and
even cheat.").
2003]
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that unintentionally promote religion from acts that do so intentionally. In other
words, the neutral valence that we customarily attach to the construction of a
road is a normative choice.23 In essence, we strike it from the sociologist's list
of public interferences with the religious marketplace, not because it is not a
public interference, but because we approve of it. This can be said about a
variety of policies.
To be sure, there are many things we do not want the government to be
doing in connection with religious choices. For example, we do not want the
government punishing people for worshiping one way and not another, or for
refusing to worship. Nor do we want the government putting people in a
position where they have to choose between hypocritical compliance with law
24and adhering to their own convictions. But the reasons we do not want
government doing these things have remarkably little to do with how they will
affect religious behavior. Many of these acts are abhorrent and should be and
are quickly condemned in the United States. But our attitude toward such acts
does not depend in the first instance upon our desire to protect the religious
marketplace from distortion. It depends instead upon fundamental notions of
how government should treat human beings.
Indeed we should be grateful that we have non-instrumentalist reasons to
forbid religious persecution, because there appears to be little the government
can do to cause people to become religious, or to give up their existing religious
affiliation. 25 Thus, if our only concern were to protect the religious marketplace
from artificial constraints, we would be forced to tolerate a large category of
acts that, however shocking, do not succeed in causing people to renounce their
faith. This is not to say, of course, that official action is always irrelevant to the
religious marketplace and that substantive neutrality in practice is the same as
formal neutrality. For example, it cannot be denied that sustained official
opposition to a particular religious practice can be successful in suppressing the
23 Cf Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956).
24 See Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 12 (1947) (quoting the "Virginia
Bill for Religious Liberty" of 1786) ("Almighty God hath created the mind free[, and] all
attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend
only to beget habits of hypocrisy and meanness.").
25 See STARK & FINKE, supra note 17, at 73 ("The collapse of Soviet Communism had many
remarkable consequences, not the least of which was to reveal the abject failure of several
generations of dedicated efforts to indoctrinate atheism in eastern Europe and the former Soviet
Union."); id. at 199 ("[R]eligious economies can never be fully monopolized, even when backed
by the full coercive powers of the state. Indeed, even at the height of its temporal power, the
medieval church was surrounded by heresy and dissent.").
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practice, at least temporarily. 26 Moreover, a significant body of research has
demonstrated that government can hurt institutional religion through co-
option.27 But, the general imperviousness of the religious behavior to official
policy, combined with our habitual tolerance of many "neutral" policies that
actually facilitate religion, suggests that a realistic, substantively neutral
approach to the Establishment Clause will yield a different result from a
formally neutral approach much less often than we have generally assumed.
Sociology appears to teach us three things about the religious marketplace
that bear on the subject of true substantive neutrality. First, as noted above,
persecution on religious grounds is rarely successful. Thus, if we want a reason
to forbid such persecution, we need one that kicks in long before persecution is
likely to affect behavior. Justice Sandra Day O'Connor's "endorsement test"
arguably speaks to this need, because it depends on how people are likely to
interpret official acts rather than how people are likely to react to them.28 On
the other hand, the cost of protecting people's sensibilities imposed by Justice
O'Connor's test may be more than we are willing to pay, particularly where no
injury is intended.
Second, changes in the supply of religion account for religious choice much
more readily than changes in the demand of individual believers. In other
words, epiphanies and historical events that radically alter individual and
communal perspectives account for relatively few changes in religious
behavior. Instead, the biggest explanation for such changes - such as why
people become religious in the sense of moving from the category of the
unchurched to the category of the churched - is that someone close to them
exposes them to a tradition that they find appealing for reasons that existed
before the exposure.29 In light of this finding, pursuit of substantive neutrality
26 See Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Integrity of Survival: A Mormon Response to Stanley
Hauerwas, 42 DEPAULL. REv. 167 (1992).
27 See infra note 30 and accompanying text.
28 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
([Governmental endorsement of religion] sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community. Disapproval
sends the opposite message.).
29 See STARK & FINKE, supra note 17, at 86 ("When people change churches or even
religions, it is usually not because their preferences have changed, but because the new church
or faith more effectively appeals to preferences they have always had."); id. at 122 ("[C]onverts
very seldom are religious seekers, and conversion is seldom the culmination of a conscious
search - most converts do not so much as find a new faith as the new faith finds them."); id. at
117 (discussing a study by sociologists John Lofland and Rodney Stark about how people came
2003] 583
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indicates that we should ask how much a particular policy will change people's
close social contacts, such that they will adopt the religious affiliation of the
people with whom they associate.
Finally, sociologists have documented that true religious establishment -
like the establishment in England - really can inhibit active participation in the
church.3° In light of this finding, pursuit of substantive neutrality indicates that
we should ask whether public policies under consideration are likely to make
religious groups dependent upon the government for their existence and thereby
deprive them of their independence and vitality.
To summarize, if we are going to pursue a realistic form of substantive
neutrality, the focus of our attention is actually quite simple, and quite lenient
from the government's point of view. In short, we should ask: (1) whether
policies under consideration will cause people to form new relationships along
religious lines, thus provoking changes in religious behavior that might not
have occurred but for official action; and (2) whether such policies will cause
religious groups to become dependent upon the government, and therefore less
to join the Unification Church, associated with the Reverend Sun M. Moon) (emphasis
removed):
Eventually, Lofland and Stark realized that of all the people the Unificationists
encountered in their efforts to spread their faith, the only ones who joined were those
whose interpersonal attachments to members overbalanced their attachments to
nonmembers. In part this is because ... social networks make religious beliefs
plausible and new social networks thereby make new religious beliefs plausible....
In effect, conversion is seldom about seeking or embracing an ideology; it is about
bringing one's religious behavior into alignment with that of one's friends and family
members.
30 See id. at 228:
Socialized religious economies weaken religious organizations in several ways. First,
the state often intrudes, even to the point of imposing its views on church teachings
and practices - invariably in ways that make the church less strict. Second, as Adam
Smith pointed out, kept clergy are lazy. Thirdly, kept laity are lazy too, being trained
to regard religion as free.... Finally, despite claims of religious freedom, in all of
these nations [referring to several nations in Western Europe], the state interferes with
and otherwise limits potential competitors of the state churches.
See also id. at 69 ("Contrary to the received wisdom, the conversion of Constantine did not
cause the triumph of Christianity. Rather, it was the first, and most significant step, in slowing
its progress, draining its vigor, and distorting its moral vision."); id. at 68-69 (explaining why
Christianity failed to take Northern Europe by storm in the middle ages) ("The Christianity that
triumphed over Rome was a mass social movement in a highly competitive environment. The
Christianity that subsequently left most of Europe only nominally converted, at best, was an
established, subsidized state church that sought to extend itself, not through missionizing the
population, but by baptizing kings.").
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vital. In fact, as lenient as these two tests are, the first of them is arguably too
strict, because it fails to take into account whether people object to the religious
dimensions of new social networks to which they are exposed because of
official policy. In some cases they may object, but in other cases they may find
their new contacts either unobjectionable or in fact desirable.3' On this view,
although a policy under review may, strictly speaking, be a cause in fact of
religious change in the case of a willing convert brought into contact with a
proselytizer, it is hard to condemn such a result on normative grounds.
In light of the foregoing observations, a small but critical list of deviations
from true formal neutrality are in order. First, no matter how formally neutral a
public program may be, it must include at least one meaningful secular option
for all participating individuals. Thus, a court would properly find an
establishment if all the organizations participating in a public program were
religious in nature, even if the criteria for participating were formally neutral,
and even if the government took steps to recruit secular organizations. In the
worst-case scenario, the foregoing principle would require the government to
set up its own secular provider. Arguably, this principle could be tempered
somewhat by an adjustment to the laws of standing, such that only a person
desiring a secular alternative and unable to find one would have standing to
object to lack of a secular alternative, if the criteria for participation themselves
were formally neutral, and if no evidence lay that the government had actually
discouraged secular organizations from participating.
Second, in order to protect the independence and vitality of religious
organizations that participate in educational and charitable choice programs, we
will need to apply a robust version of the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.
Attempts by the government to control the behavior of religious groups
receiving public funds in ways that implicate religious autonomy should be
limited to those that would satisfy strict scrutiny, or that are necessary to
promote the purposes of the program at issue. Thus, a requirement that a group
receiving public funds not discriminate on the basis of race would be
justifiable, as would a requirement that recipients of funds account strictly for
their use.
31 See generally id. at 137 ("People do not simply succumb to missionary efforts, for
conversion not only involves interaction; it quite clearly involves introspection."); id. at 121
("Research confirms that converts are overwhelmingly recruited from the ranks of those lacking
a prior religious commitment or having only a nominal connection to a religious group."); id. at
123 ("When they do shift their affiliations, most people switch to a religious body very similar
to the one in which they were raised.").
2003]
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It is possible, of course, that religious organizations will grow toward the
light of governmental funding programs, but this is not inherently subversive of
religious independence or initiative. Enterprising religions, just like
enterprising for-profit entities, will grow toward the light of whatever best
serves their mission - in their case, the saving of souls and the doing of good
work. What is dangerous, however, is that religious organizations will lose
sight of their true market and start acting on the assumption that they succeed
by pleasing the government. This is a real concern with grant-in-aid programs
that do not depend upon the number of clients in the private sector that an
organization serves. Thus, an organization receiving, for example, $500,000 to
run a soup kitchen would have less incentive to attract clients than an
organization paid in proportion to the number of clients served. In addition, a
provider guaranteed a certain level of public funding, such as a grant-in-aid
recipient, would have relatively little incentive to leaven its religious message
with secular attractions. As a consequence, another important deviation from
complete formal neutrality - and indeed the one most notably incorporated into
the Zelman formulation - is the emphasis upon individual choice, or a
consumer-oriented approach to the selection of provider, religious or not.
Finally, there may be certain activities that are simply too inherently
associated with religion ever to permit their funding via a formally neutral
program. I have in mind here a truly ritualistic service that serves a purpose as
broadly normative as promoting peace on earth. Ultimately, we may have
difficulty identifying this class of activities with precision, but we certainly can
resolve some of the easier cases. Eating and obtaining shelter have sufficient
secular content to permit their facilitation by religious groups without running
afoul of the principle I am trying to elucidate. Similarly, receiving medical
care, learning, and seeking to overcome specific addictions have acquired
enough secular content in the age of secularism and science to fall into the same
category as eating and obtaining shelter. But seeking to accomplish such broad,
normative goals as peace on earth that have never had broad-based secular
counterparts may not be funded by the government, even as part of a program
that otherwise conforms to principles of formal neutrality.
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